"China's Bubble" Warning By Doomsayers

You gotta love it how more and more people just seem to join the chorus once somebody with some credibility says something interesting. China is in the midst of "the greatest bubble in history," said James Rickards, former general counsel of hedge fund Long- Term Capital Management LP. Who is Rickards??? Why is he saying things at all? He's just the counsel at what was the biggest collapse in the 90s.... aahhh. The Chinese central bank’s balance sheet resembles that of a hedge fund buying dollars and short-selling the yuan, said Rickards, now the senior managing director for market intelligence at McLean, Virginia-based consulting firm Omnis Inc. Rickards joins hedge fund manager Jim Chanos, Marc Faber and professor Kenneth Rogoff in warning of an overheating and potential crash in China's economy following a rally in stock and property prices. Now even the World Bank has chimed in to say the same thing.

Are we heading down the road as opined by those above. Beijing has already raised lenders' requirements twice this year. Let's look at some problem areas.



If China’s credit growth were to slow sharply, non-performing loans (NPLs) would spike by the end of the year. Although the problem would not be as large as in the late 1990s, another recapitalization would be difficult without tapping government coffers. The asset management companies set up to recapitalize the banks in 1999 have yet to repay their loans, and nobody is willing to buy their assets at prices anywhere near what would be needed to cover their costs.

The problem seems to be with the politically-connected municipal investment and development companies (MIDCs), which would likely be able to maintain their credit lines. The MDICs are at the center of a risky shell game with local banks, in which land and credit lines are swapped to maximize the companies’ access to financing. However, most infrastructure projects financed by these companies remain a long way from profitability, and land prices used for collateral were seriously inflated last year. If they no longer had access to credit, many MDICs would default, which would spark a tough fight over who is responsible for the redemption of the loans. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) estimated that 8,000 MDICs accounted for 14% of new lending in 2009, though other estimates put the figure much higher.

In the Chinese bond market their presence was even larger—they issued RMB250 billion in bonds last year, up from RMB30 billion the year before, accounting for the bulk of the 88% jump in corporate bond issuance through Q3 2009. The State Council recently said it is seeking to regulate these companies, calling their financing a “latent systemic risk in the financial sector.”Chinese regulators have told commercial lenders to restrict new lending to municipal development companies, the official Shanghai Securities News reported on February 24, 2010. Banks were told to stop lending to any projects backed solely by a local government guarantee and reject any projects that lacked adequate capital.

Victor Shih, a professor at Northwestern, estimates that their total borrowing between 2004 and 2009 was US$1.6 trillion (RMB10.9 trillion), or about 33% of GDP and 70% of its foreign exchange reserves. Banks have already pledged additional credit to the companies. "If the central government does not restrict bank lending to them, these entities will go deeper into debt, thus either requiring the sale of much more land or the creation of a pile of nonperforming loans."

Shih estimates that government debt, including the hidden liabilities, could reach RMB39.8 trillion (US$5.8 trillion) or 96% of GDP in 2011. This includes non-performing loans held by state-owned banks, liabilities of the development banks, and the debts of the asset management companies set up to recapitalize the banking sector. "The worst case is a pretty large-scale financial crisis around 2012". "The slowdown would last at least two years and maybe longer."In 2009, the Ministry of Land and Resources reported that government land sales netted RMB1.6 trillion (US$234 billion), most of which went to local government coffers. The government sold 319,000 hectares of land in 2009, up 44% from 2008, the revenues from which increased 63% y/y. Land sold for "real-estate use" accounted for 84% of this. At the height of the previous property bubble in 2007, the government raised RMB1.3 trillion from land sales. If China's property bubble were to burst in 2010 the revenue from land sales could dry up, which would weigh heavily on local governments' abilities to continue financing the stimulus.

Official debt-to-GDP ratio was 17.7% at end of 2008, but this may be closer to 60% once local government debt, backstopped bank loans and bad assets are included. This is still below the U.S. level and not explosive, but stimulus spending by local governments and loans from state-owned banks may push the 2009 fiscal deficit up to 10% of GDP.

Hot money poses another problem for RMB appreciation. If the RMB looks like a one-way bet, which a modest and steady appreciation path would indicate, then international funds will find their way into property and other assets in Beijing, Shanghai and the other major cities. RGE estimates that China experienced about US$40-50 billion in “hot money” inflows in Q4 2009. This could worsen the asset price bubbles regulators have been trying to ease since late last year. (Housing affordability is among Chinese consumers’ top complaints.)

There are problem spots in China, and its mainly in property. The MDICs are too reliant on land sales and have borrowed excessively. Its about to implode anytime, just another couple of rate hikes and another round of curbs on lending should do that.

While that may also deflate China stock markets, I do think the ill effects on stocks will be very temporary. Just have a look at the two charts below:

While the US is gaining share, China is losing share. Aside from an uptick in the summer months of 2009, China's stock market cap as a % of world market cap has been trending downward throughout the entire rebound.

One of the easy ways to see how a country is performing relative to other countries is to look at its market cap as a percentage of world market cap. In the early stages of the global rebound off of the March lows, the US rose significantly, but other countries were gaining even more. In recent months, however, the tide has turned, and the US is now outperforming the rest of the world. As shown below, US stock market cap as a percentage of world market cap has been steadily rising since last November. During the 2003-2007 bull market, emerging markets and other countries really outperformed the US. If this bull market continues and the US continues to gain share, it will represent a very big trend change that will make a huge impact on portfolio performance depending on an investor's domestic versus international equity allocation.

The charts also reveal that the bulk of the liquidity has gone into property and not stocks. Hence it will have a muted effect when property side busts.

Moody's upgraded China's ratings outlook to positive from stable on November 9, 2009, keeping the rating at A1, on expectations that the country's economic recovery is taking stronger hold with only modest effects on the government's finances. The agency cited possible asset price bubbles and the long-term effects of China's stimulus program as risks to its outlook. It also upgraded the ratings for seven Chinese banks, a sector that some analysts worry may be hit with a surge in non-performing loans following this year's sharp credit growth. Moody's said that the banks could withstand such "stress scenarios" given their strong capital positions and earnings.

There are those who would defend the property boom in China. JPMorgan's Jing Ulrich argues in the FT that Chinese real estate is not overvalued and the fallout of a price contraction would not be severe because there is less leverage involved. "Chinese household debt amounts to approximately 17% of GDP, compared to roughly 96% in the US and 62% in the eurozone. ... Over the past 5 years, urban household incomes grew at a 13.2% compound annual growth rate, compared to an 11.9% CAGR in home prices."

While that may be the case, the problem with China property is with the MDICs and not the end buyers per se. So, JP Morgan can still be wrong.

May main reason for saying China is not headed for a big implosion is that the Chinese economy is still relatively a relatively closed economy. The liquidity swishing around is still controlled by Beijing, with the exception of some hot money into property. We cannot regard China like normal more open economies - e.g. Malaysia or Indonesia, where we can be on the receiving end of a lot of hot money, and will feel the gravity of it when these funds exit. You do not have such a keen issue in China.

Beijing knows the unbalanced lending to state firms and municipal councils, and is trying to redress the problem, albeit a tad late. Really should get out of China property for the next 12 months.



p/s photos: Wang Yi Bing

The Real Picture Behind 'China Crisis'

There are basically two groups of investors in their opinion of China's economy. In one camp are those who are optimistic on the economy’s strength and its ability to thrive in an otherwise bleak global environment.

The most recent economic data release showed a sharp rebound in the Chinese export sector has further enhanced the positive sentiment

In the other camp are an increasing number who believe that China’s economic
miracle is nothing but a mirage and that 2010 will be a year of painful reckoning. Some analysts are claiming that China’s growth model is fundamentally flawed and the massive stimulus measures adopted since late 2008 have only intensified the economy’s structural imbalances, which will make the inevitable downside adjustment even bigger. The usual worrying features of the economy such as asset bubbles, “mis-investment”, an inefficient banking system, growing social unrest and corrupt governance - some are predicting an imminent economic crash and even social chaos. Some prominent hedge fund managers have reportedly even begun shorting the “China story” in recent months. Well, for every buyer, there has to be a seller... so the story goes.

Is the economy headed toward a sudden collapse, as expected by the “house of cards” camp? The answers to these questions obviously weigh heavy in investors’ decision making. There has never been a lack of skepticism toward the Chinese economy. Even 5, 10, 15 years back, there were the usual China-bashers and permanent-bears who have been proven wrong over and over again by the country’s enormous economic success and social progress over the past three decades. However, the question marks about the country’s fundamental growth model deserve careful assessment. The core argument of this bearish camp is that the Chinese economy is mainly driven by capital spending and exports, both of which have exhausted their potential. The economy is bound to slow sharply due to a lack of new sources of growth. Or is that the full picture?



While there is always a chance of a major collapse in any economy, I think China is going to chug along just fine. I do not think that China’s capital spending is excessive. China’s capital spending boom has mainly been driven by profit incentives rather than government direction. Those who think that China’s capital spending is terribly inefficient and will face an imminent crash will be proven wrong. If you take the data and extrapolate on internal capital returns on the country's projects - China's figure is very much in line with other developing countries.

Second, one may argue that the U.S. consumer sector has entered into a prolonged period of deleveraging, and that its demand for Chinese products will never recover to pre-crisis levels. However, an important fact is that China’s export market has become increasingly diversified. If you refer to the chart, even though the U.S. remains the largest market for Chinese overseas sales, its market share has shrunk from a peak of 22% in the late 1990s to 17% today. In fact, Chinese sales in some of the nontraditional export markets such as Australia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East have experienced much faster growth in recent years than sales to other developed markets.

Meanwhile, China continues to reduce trade barriers with emerging Asian countries. At the beginning of this year, China and the 10-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) formally established one of the largest regional free-trade zones in the world.

Over the years, the Chinese authorities have worked to boost domestic consumption in an attempt to reduce the economy’s dependence on exports and capital spending. In this sense, slowing capex and exports should be taken as a positive sign, as it means that policy makers’ consumption-boosting initiatives have finally begun to bear fruit.



The Chinese authorities still have a lot of room to boost growth. Infrastructure in the country’s rural regions is still grossly insufficient and needs tremendous government input. Massive domestic savings and the very low public sector debt burden means there is a lot of financial resources the government can utilize to buy a lot of growth, similar to what they have done over the past year. This kind of growth-boosting campaign is of course unsustainable over a prolonged period of time, but China is among the few countries in the world that are most capable of dealing with a crisis scenario with extraordinary policies – and have a significant war chest to do it with.

Hence we should not see a crash or a major crisis of any sorts in 2010. Yes, the markets will have to experience some bumps here and there, in particular when Beijing tries to tighten the screws on lending and rein in liquidity a bit every now and then - but its for the betterment of the economy, not a noose around the economy's neck.

Currently, the authorities are beginning to tighten policies again. The risk factor is the country’s bubble-prone asset markets and potential damage to its banking system. Specifically, as a result of China’s massive household sector savings and highly pro-cyclical global capital inflows, Chinese asset prices are prone to boom-bust cycles. So far the extreme volatility in asset prices, such as the 70% crash in the domestic A-share market and housing price declines in some major metropolitan areas between 2007 and 2008, has inflicted little damage on banks’ overall asset quality, as the above chart would indicate clearly. This is because policymakers have maintained a significant buffer between asset markets and the banking system - banks’ mortgage lending practices have been very conservative, with a mandatory down payment ratio of 20-40% for real estate purchases. Banks’ direct exposure to the stock market is also negligible, as leveraged investments are not allowed.

Recently, the authorities announced that index futures, margin trading and short-selling in the A-share market have been officially approved. Even though it may take months for these instruments to be developed and deployed, and they are undoubtedly positive in terms of improving the efficiency of the domestic capital market.

Structurally, China’s economic performance will most likely continue to outpace that of the rest of the world. This warrants a more positive stance on Chinese assets over global benchmarks, especially as current valuations of Chinese assets are comparable to global and emerging market averages. Have a look at the chart above on China's valuations - its very reasonable still. From a cyclical point of view, it’s important to recognize that there is a disconnect between a country’s economic performance and its stock market. One does not need to be super-bullish on an economy’s immediate growth outlook to be positive on its financial asset prices.

Stock markets are highly sensitive to policy shifts, which is a lagging response to economic performance. Weak growth leads to policy easing, which is stimulative for the stock market. Similarly, strong growth normally leads to tightening policy, which bodes ill for equity prices. In some cases, good economic news turns out to be a headwind for stocks. Currently, China’s strong growth recovery is pushing policymakers to tighten, a critical juncture that is typically associated with heightened volatility in equity prices. While the Chinese A-share market will continue to struggle in the coming months, investors should not take this as a sign of pending economic troubles. These tightening measures are good problems to have.


p/s photos: Gu Chen

China Banks' Risk Profile

The bulk of market capitalisation in Asian equity is in bank stocks. China has been leading the way, and the banks' health should be monitored closely. We know of the rampant bank lending that has been on going for the past 12 months. Now we need to know the extent of the potential bad debts and how that would play out in 2010. We already know that bad debts for credit cards have already doubled year on year and that is an ominous sign.

China's banks posted strong profit growth in Q3 2009 as new lending continued to surge. The jump in new lending meant that non-performing loans decreased as a percentage of assets. Regulators started to tighten lending standards in Q3, which along with the need to meet new capital adequacy requirements, could eat into profits. However, a shift toward longer-term loans and of savers into demand deposits may increase the net-interest margin for banks, which fell through Q3 2009 due to lower interest rates.

Capital Adequacy Ratios

Fitch warned that due to "major ongoing weaknesses in loan classification and disclosure of off-balance-sheet exposures" China's banks' capital positions are probably worse than they appear. The banks have used an increasing amount of off-balance-sheet transactions to bundle loans and sell them to investors, which represents a "growing pool of hidden credit risk." These transactions free up space on the banks' balance sheets so that they can increase their lending without lowering their capital adequacy ratios.

China’s Banking Regulatory Commission denied reports that it would raise the minimum capital ratios to 13% in 2010 from 10-11% now, but it said that banks would need to develop “medium-to-long-term plans” to replenish capital after the lending binge of 2009. As of September, all of the largest banks except the Bank of China had capital ratios over 12%. The shift toward longer-term loans from Q2 2009 has boosted the net interest margins of China’s banks, but the loans also come with higher risk weightings, pushing down their capital ratios. In order to maintain their 12% capital adequacy ratios, China’s 11 largest listed banks would need to raise an additional RMB368 billion (US$43 billion) in capital, according to calculations by BNP. Core capital adequacy ratios at the banks fell to 8.9% at the end of September 2009, from over 10% at the end of 2008.

In August 2009, the WSJ reported that the China Banking Regulatory Commission was considering a ruling that subordinated debt held by other banks would no longer count as supplementary capital. Estimates suggested that as much as 51% of subordinated debt issued by banks (RMB210.0 billion in H1 2009, three times the total amount for 2008) was held by other banks. In October, regulators issued a ruling that was significantly easier for banks to meet: Only subordinated debt acquired after July 1, 2009 would need to be deducted from Tier-2 capital. This will make it more difficult to replenish capital by issuing subordinated debt but does not require significant changes as a result of the ruling.

When the government recapitalized the banks in the late 1990s, it formed asset management companies (AMCs) to purchase non-performing loans from the banks, which were funded through bonds held by the banks. The AMCs have had very low recovery rates on the NPLs, and their bonds may have to be rolled over or written off. The government opted to allow at least one of the recapitalization bonds that allowed China's banks to become commercial enterprises to be rolled over for another decade. A US$36.2 billion bond held by Cinda Asset Management was to come due at the end of September, but was rolled over for another ten years. Writing off the principle due would have cost CCB more than half of its net assets, and the remaining bonds, which come due in 2009/10, are expected to be rolled over as well.

From October 2009, insurance companies will be allowed to invest in the property market. This will allow state-owned banks to transfer underperforming commercial property holdings to insurers at book value, and insurance companies will not have to write down the property values because they will be booked as long-term assets. This lets insurance companies diversify their assets to better match the duration of their liabilities but also protects banks' balance sheets.

Central Huijin, a division of China's sovereign wealth fund, said that it would continue to buy shares in China's three largest banks to reassure investors and stabilize their share prices.

How Much Will Non-Performing Loans Increase?

The increase in NPLs may come in mid to late 2010 given that they tend to peak 12-18 months after a credit boom. However, the revival in property markets and increase in mid- to longer-term loans may limit the deterioration of assets.

The surge in NPLs would be limited to RMB400 billion (US$58.5 billion) in 2010, but another RMB250 billion (US$36.6 billion) in NPLs could emerge in 2011. If credit is tightened more in 2010, NPLs would jump higher.

The Banking Regulatory Committee is raising minimum capital adequacy requirements from 8% in 2008 to 11% by 2010, but the PBoC controls the reserve requirements, blunting the regulators’ ability to control loan growth.

FT Dragon Beat: If 1/6 of the RMB20 trillion in bank lending to be issued from 2008 to 2010 goes sour, then the government's liability would be RMB3.3 trillion, which is about the same as all the nonperforming loans recognized so far.


p/s photo: Freida Pinto

China Is Really Aware That It Has a Bubble Situation

Unpaid credit card debt in China has risen by a horrifying 126.5% from a year ago. Beijing should have known this very well as it was central government which instructed the banks to lend like crazy 12 months ago. As at the end of September 2009, there was 7.43bn yuan of credit card debt that was at least 6 months overdue. Mainland Chinese banks pushed those credit cards aggressively when Beijing "encouraged" the banks to be "easier with loans and credit disbursements". Beijing had encouraged banks to expand that line of business thinking that it would boost retail sales. Well, it may have had that effect, but they now also have a credit binge problem. The overdue amount represented 3.4% of total credit card debt.

The problem can get a lot worse because as it stands, the penetration rate in China for credit cards is only 0.13 cards per person now. Compare that to the US, a place where like New Zealand for sheep, there are 1.5bn cards for its 300m population - unbelievable, 5 cards for each person, including kids.


p/s photos: Marie Ann Umali

China Is Aware That There Is A Bubble

As China is facing the prospect of large capital inflows from investors betting on RMB appreciation in 2010, policymakers have made it easier for mainland Chinese to invest abroad. This may be adding to the massive fund inflows other regional markets have experienced in 2009, especially China’s SARs. China’s rapid credit growth and loose monetary policies are also encouraging the trend.

• WSJ: A bubbly property market in Hong Kong and record gambling revenues in Macau are partially a result of capital leaking out of China through “under-the-table transfers.” GaveKal Dragonomics says that the scale of the “shady money” coming from China’s loose credit and stimulus measures “is becoming slightly embarrassing for Beijing.” Capital controls are supposed to regulate the amount of money flowing to the SARs, but offshore bank accounts and other channels allow money to flow relatively freely. (11/23/09)
• Michael Casey, WSJ: “[A] booming China is importing easy money from the Fed at a time when it least needs it, and is then exporting the same to its similarly undeserving neighbors.” (11/18/09)

Measures Taken to Increase Capital Outflows

• On November 11, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) said it would expand a program that allows individuals to exchange up US$5,000 per-day to non-financial institutions. This helped to spark a rally in China’s B-shares, which are mainland shares denominated in foreign currencies. (Bloomberg, 11/13/09)
• In October SAFE announced US$1.5 billion in new quotas under the qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) program, which allows mainland funds to be invested in overseas assets. These were the first new quotas granted in 17 months.
• In July 2009, SAFE eased rules on the use of foreign exchange by Chinese firms, which will allow companies to borrow in foreign currencies on the mainland, invest with their foreign exchange revenues, and seek new funding sources.
• China's outbound direct investment reached US$55.6 billion in 2008, nearly double the amount in 2007, but much lower than the US$92.4 billion of inbound direct investment. In 2009, the gap looks may narrow. Through Q3 2009, the Ministry of Finance reported US$32.8 billion in non-financial outbound FDI, up slightly from the same period last year. Meanwhile, FDI to China decreased 14% y/y over the same period.
• Mainland Chinese are limited to converting US$50,000 per-year into foreign currency, but investors often pool the quotas of family and friends to get around the limits.

p/s photo: Maggie Wu

How Sustainable Is China's Growth

• China's economy expanded 8.9% y/y in Q3 2009, bringing the year-to-date growth rate up to 7.7% y/y. Industrial production (value added) expanded 12.4% y/y in Q3, up from 9.1% in Q2. Investment continues to drive growth with fixed asset investment grew by 33.4% through Q3, 6.4 percentage points above the rate posted the year previous. Consumption has held up, with retail sales climbing 15.1% through Q3 in nominal terms, or 17% in real terms. CPI fell 1.1% through Q3 but has climbed on a monthly basis. Exports and imports are likewise climbing on a m/m basis. (National Bureau of Statistics, 10/21/09)

The Outlook for Q4 and Beyond


• The pace of growth slowed in Q3 to about 9.5% on an annualized q/q basis in Q3 from an estimated 16% pace in Q2. Industrial production growth picked up to 13.8% in September from 12.8% in August and 10.8% in July. Retail sales accelerated slightly to 15.5% y/y, roughly similar to August's 15.4% growth and consumer prices have continued to climb on a m/m basis falling only 0.8% y/y in September (from -1.2% in August).
• Premier Wen Jiabao: "China’s economic rebound is unstable, unbalanced and not yet solid. We cannot and will not change the direction of our policies when the conditions aren’t appropriate.” (via FT, September 2009)
• Minggao Shen and Ken Peng of Citi note that "domestic demand is still the main driver of current economic momentum in China. Retail sales are again accelerating after holding steady in the spring.The 15.4% y/y growth received large support from the housing boom, as construction materials sales grew 36.6%y/y, up from 25.8% in July" while other goods were merely stable. However, a pickup in exports (they fell on an absolute and seasonally adjusted basis from July) is needed for further growth momentum as other stimulus may have already peaked (09/ 11/09)
• Economist Lu Ting, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch: Growth could reach 9% in Q3 and 10% in Q4. (via Bloomberg)
• Flemming Nielsen of Danske Bank forecasts that "sequential growth in industrial production in China is slowing, despite the year-on-year growth in industrial production in August to around 13.0% y/y from 10.8% y/y in th previous month. This development will be consistent with GDP growth easing to around12% q/q in Q3 from more than 16% q/q in Q2. " (09/07/09)

Q2's reacceleration


• Chinese growth accelerated to 7.9% y/y in Q2 2009, from 6.1% in Q1 (the slowest in more than a decade) as Chinese investment and bank lending continued to accelerate, and retail sales held up. Government spending and bank lending have contributed to faster growth despite weak exports. Q2's growth which analysts suggest was 12=16% on a q/q basis came was the first acceleration after seven quarters of deceleration. Investment (35.3%) and industrial production (10.7%) saw further increases on a y/y basis in June 2009, while construction rose for the first time in a year.
• Economist Ken Peng, Citi: The annualized q/q pace of growth was around 11.8% from Q2, but the weakness in consumer prices indicates China is not out of the woods.
• National Bureau of Statistics: Of the 7.1% real GDP growth in H1 2009, 6.2 percentage points (ppts) came from investment, spending contributed 3.8ppts and net exports took away 2.9ppts. (via Citi)

How Sustainable Is China's Recovery?

• IMF: Expansionary fiscal/monetary policies, a rebound in capital markets/inflows, and the growth impulse from restocking helped China's economy to recover. The IMF forecasts 8.5% real GDP growth in 2009 and 9% growth in 2010. "With the recovery gaining strength, the policy challenge is to determine when and how to withdraw policy support while ensuring a successful transition to more balanced medium-term growth."
  (October 1, 2009)
  
• World Bank: Very expansionary fiscal and monetary policies kept the economy growing respectably with a 7.2% growth rate is expected for 2009. China may not grow in the high double digits until the global economy recovers. Market-based investment will lag, and consumption will slow, meaning that the boost to growth may not carry through to 2010. (June 2009)
• OECD: Because of China's policy responses, Chinese GDP growth is forecast to be 7.7% in 2009 and 9.3% in 2010, an upward revision from March forecasts of 6.3% in 2009 and 8.5% in 2010. (June 2009)
• Morgan Stanley: "On a seasonally adjusted basis, the economy experienced a 5% rebound in Q1 2009, after the first q/q contraction (-0.5%) in almost eight years. Aggressive policy stimulus should bring further recovery in H2 2009, making China among the first to emerge from the global downturn. The recovery should be relatively 'job-rich' but 'profit-deficient,' especially in H1 2009, with those exposed to government-supported capex programs likely benefiting most."
• Bank of Finland: "The massive increase in lending associated with the stimulus package could lead to imbalances in the Chinese economy, which might make economic policy more difficult and constrain growth. The current stimulus measures have only reinforced the investment- and export-orientation of the economy, while domestic demand continues to play a minor role." (September 2009)
  
• ADB suggests China is not rebalancing away from investment-led growth, but is shifting investment sectors. China runs the risk of entrenched inflation and overheating in some sectors.
• In Q1, government stimulus boosted investment and consumption held up, despite a fall in real incomes. Final consumption, investment and net exports contributed 4.3, 2.0 and -0.2 percentage points to GDP, respectively.

p/s photos: Kim Ahep

China's Growth Story Too Dependent On Easy Credit?

Just how dependent is the China growth over the last 6 months on the easy credit conditions? This blog has been harping on the liquidity trap that is almost inevitable. The flip side is that the markets in China and HK will continue to benefit as Beijing would continue to "allow and encourage" more state firms to list in Shanghai and/or do a H-share listing - both very effective ways to drain some of the liquidity from the system, or at least keep it within a sphere where it could be 'controlled' somewhat.

Bank lending surged in H1 2009 to RMB7.37 trillion (US$1.08 trillion), more than three times higher than H1 2008. The figure, totaling 25% of China's annual GDP in 2008, is 47% higher than the government's RMB5 trillion target for 2009. There is significant monthly variation, however. Available data suggests that lending slowed in July 2009 even more than in April and May 2009, but June loans surged to RMB1.53 trillion (US$224 billion), a return to Q1 levels. New loans could surpass the revised RMB10 trillion benchmark for 2009. The scale of loan extension has sparked sustainability concerns, raised the risk of non-performing loans (NPLs) and helped to fuel asset-price inflation (property and equities). However, concerns that the government might rein in loans contributed to a weakening of equity markets in early August.

Will Lending Growth Continue?

• Banks lent RMB1.53 trillion (US$224 billion) in June, more than double the RMB664.5 billion extended in May, sparking concerns that tightening may follow. M2 rose 28.5% in June, and outstanding loans were up 34.4% y/y in June (both record highs). The central bank may have already started to tighten, selling more bonds to soak up some of the liquidity.
• The reported lending figures from China's largest banks suggest that July's new lending should total around RMB400 billion (US$58.6 billion). Many of the commercial bills from earlier in the year will be refinanced in July through September, reducing new lending. Still, credit availability will likely remain relatively loose.
• The big four banks reportedly cut lending to RMB168 billion (US$24.6 billion) in July from RMB497 billion (US$72.7 billion) in June, though smaller banks have increased their share of lending in recent months from about half to two-thirds. As a result, lending may not have slowed as much as some estimate.
• If state-owned banks contributed one third of July new bank lending, like they did in Q2, then the July figure should come in around RMB500 billion (US$73.2 billion). Though if the trend of smaller commercial banks contributing a greater share continues, the actual figure could be higher.
• The narrowing spread between M1 (18.7% y/y in May, up from 17.5% in April) and M2 (25.7% y/y in May, down from 26% in April) suggests that economic growth is gaining momentum as corporations are increasingly confident and willing to embark on future investments.
• Loan growth shifted toward medium- and long-term loans in Q2. Commercial bills accounted for 21% in April, down from 32% in Q1, while other short-term loans declined by nearly RMB80 billion. Deposits again outpaced loans, reducing the loan-deposit ratio, which should marginally ease fears of bad debts, as firms are storing liquidity.
• Even if loan growth slows, the net increase in loans might be around RMB8-8.5 trillion, 26-28% above 2008 for loans outstanding.

Factors Behind Lending Expansion


• The People's Bank of China (PBoC) is unlikely to tighten monetary policy because the central bank is not accountable for regulating bank risk. Bank lending is playing an important role in the fiscal stimulus, and the central bank may plan to pump in money to fill holes in banks’ balance sheets from bad loans.
  
• The Banking Regulatory Committee is raising minimum capital adequacy requirements from 8% in 2008 to 12% by 2010, but the PBoC controls the reserve requirements, blunting the regulators’ ability to control loan growth.
• The China Banking Regulatory Commission may rule that subordinated debt held by another bank will no longer qualify as supplementary capital. Estimates suggest that as much as 51% of subordinated debt issued by banks (RMB210.0 billion in H1 2009, three times last year's total level) is held by other banks, which could lead banks to curtail new lending. That would be an easier path to better capital-adequacy ratios than finding buyers for the debt outside of the financial sector.
• The China Banking Regulatory Commission suggested that a concentration of credit in some industries and businesses may pose a threat to the financial system. Banks should rely more on syndication to share the risks from new lending, the secretary of the commission said.
• Loan growth is driven by monetary policy that encourages banks to expand loan portfolios. Banks make up for lower loan margins with expanded loan volumes and an assumption that stimulus-related credit losses will be covered by the central and/or local government. The increase in corporate loan portfolios and credit expansion may threaten the medium-term outlook for Chinese banks.
  
• Michael Pettis, Peking University: "Tighter monetary policy may be necessary to contain future inflationary pressures, but the unclear economic outlook and political priority of growth make this unlikely."
  
• Wu Xiaoling, PBoC Deputy Governor: The government's moral persuasion is declining. Banks should diversify, but not lend excessively in search of sustainable profits.
• Loan curbs postponed investment in H2 2006, while loans and investment reaccelerated in Q1 2007.
  

Risks from Lending Growth

• The efficiency of new loans is in doubt, as the economy does not have the capacity to turn these new loans into real activity. Potential tightening policies would further challenge the financing of small and medium sized enterprises.
• NPLs may not reach 1990s levels, as most of the current round of lending has gone to local-government-backed projects rather than unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Also, because Chinese banks are more dependent on deposits than wholesale markets for funding and China's capital account remains closed, there is little risk of a financial crisis.
• As much as 20% of the bank loans in the first five months of 2009 (US$170 billion) was invested in the stock market, while another 30% may have been used for discounted bill financing.
• China's National Audit Office found that six Chinese banks in 2008 had extended more than US$4.39 billion worth of irregular loans, an indication of inadequate management at some of the banks' local branches. The issues included improper land purchases, fraudulent mortgages and loans to non-qualifying property developers and non-approved mortgages.

p/s photos: Meisa Kuroki

China's Rising Reserves, US Fiscal & Current Account Deficits

The following is a summary of a good article by Michael Pettis on whether China's reserves goes to fund the US fiscal deficit:

Mainland China's foreign reserves surged to a record US$2.13 trillion at the end June2009, confirming concerns that speculative capital is flooding into the nation to bet on rising asset prices and a quick economic recovery. Reserves rose US$178 billion in the second quarter, the biggest quarterly increase on record and up from the US$1.95 trillion yuan at the end of March. Most of the increase was driven by the very large trade surplus and smaller but still high net FDI inflows, plus of course returns on the existing portfolio. However, there is the unexplained portion of the increase in reserves, which serves as a proxy for hot money, has turned from negative in the first quarter to very positive in the second.

Hot money is pro-cyclical, and its effect will be to intensify growth in the short term, even as it increases volatility and makes monetary policy more difficult. China's central bank must recycle the net surplus on the current account and the capital account, and with the very high current account surplus, China would be creating a huge amount of domestic money just from that source. The fact that it is also running a large capital account surplus makes the central bank's monetary management that much more difficult. As long as this fiscal-stimulus-induced boom continues, hot money inflows will heat things up even more.

Does the fact that China has huge reserves mean that they will be buying loads of US Treasuries? Is China still funding the US deficit? Most people will not be differentiating between the US fiscal deficit and the US current account deficit. China is mainly funding ONE of them, not both of them altogether. When we take things and argue, we must be clear on the details because we end up revealing how shallow and little we know of the subject matter.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. estimates that US government borrowing may total US$3.25 trillion in the year ending Sept. 30, almost four times the US$892 billion in 2008, to finance the budget deficit. Here is an example of warped thinking and a poor grasp of economics : “China’s reserves will allow the U.S. to run a higher fiscal deficit than other nations,” said Bilal Hafeez, the London-based global head of currency strategy at Deutsche Bank AG.

That is incorrect and flawed. The fact that China’s reserves have surged will in no way make it easier for the US to fund its fiscal deficit even though China has no choice but to invest these additional reserves in US Treasury bonds. Besides valuation changes and interest income, there are two reasons for the increase in the reserves – the very high trade surplus and net capital inflows into China. Take the second reason first. If money flows into China for investment purposes, it must flow out of somewhere else, and that somewhere else for the most part means the global pool of dollar savings which would anyway have been available to fund the US fiscal deficit directly or indirectly. China is acting like a unique bank that takes risk-seeking money and funnels it into low-risk assets. The USA profits from this intermediation while China runs a significant negative carry.

What about the dollars generated from the trade surplus and invested into US Treasury bonds? Won’t that help the US fund its fiscal deficit? Again the answer is no. The US government is not borrowing for abstract reasons, but rather is borrowing in order to spend locally to generate domestic employment. The amount of borrowing it needs to generate a fixed amount of domestic jobs is correlated with the US trade deficit, because it is through the trade deficit that domestic consumption “leaks out” to create jobs abroad. The higher the trade deficit, in other words, the more the US government needs to borrow to generate a fixed number of American jobs, and so the fact that China is reinvesting the dollars generated by the trade surplus with the US does not make it easier for the US to borrow since it simultaneously requires the US to borrow more. China does not fund the US fiscal deficit. It funds the US current account deficit, and it has no choice but to fund it. If the US wants China to buy US$1 trillion of new bonds every year all it has to do is ensure that the US runs a US$1 trillion trade deficit with China every year.

China may continue to bitch and scream about the Fed's printing press and the plethora of US Treasuries, but they will have to continue to buy and fund the US because the flip side of the coin does no one any good.

p/s photos: Zhou Weitong

Chinese Equity A Bubble In The Making?

Well, that should not even be a question, its a fact. The question should be for how long. Just because a market is considered expensive, does not mean one should get out immediately. It will be a tug of war. A bubble is usually because there is a concentration of liquidity and a flush of liquidity, as explained numerous times in this blog. Yesterday saw China markets doing a whipsaw, falling dramatically but still regaining some ground back. That is a prime example of a very strong momentum market. It will be volatile but the investors and players are not ready to leave the playground yet. Hence on rumours of possible tightening by the central bank, the markets will take that as an excuse to take profit and take some chips off the table. I don't think the China markets and HK market included will be paralysed so soon. Judging from the liquidity exhibited in recent IPOs in HK and Shanghai, this rally has some legs. Still, one has to react swiftly, in and out, its a traders' market not a buy and hold market.

After falling 70% from its peak in late 2007, the Shanghai Composite Index is up more than 80% off its low in November 2008 and 70% for the year. China's total market cap has risen 122% in 2009 to more than 10 trillion yuan. Valuations have more than doubled from their lows in November, but are still well below their peak in January 2008. In July IPOs resumed after new rule changes were put in place.


• July 10: The Shanghai Composite Index is up 70% in 2009, after falling 70% from the peak in late 2007. The Shenzhen index is up 87% in 2009. Trading on the first IPOs in nine months was halted after they jumped more than 20% from their opening price. The Chinese equity markets have rebounded on the back of the fiscal stimulus, expectations of a recovery in property markets and signs of improvement in domestic demand have given markets another boost
• Some of the new loans extended during the Q1 surge in bank lending likely found their way into the equity market as investors seek better return on assets, this could imply that the lending surge is not being invested in sectors that will boost growth- and that stock market gains are vulnerable especially given that Chinese equity returns have become more correlated with global trends
• China and other emerging markets have outperformed developed markets in 2009, suggesting that investors believe emerging markets have "decoupled" again. Another view is that emerging markets underperformed on the way down, and are over-performing on the way up—suggesting not decoupling but rather that they are performing like high-beta assets
  

Are Higher Valuations Sustainable?
• Stocks on the Shanghai Index traded at 28.1 times earnings in early June 2009, more than double the 12.9 factor they traded at in Nov, but below their peak in Jan 2008 at 50 times earnings
  
• Citi: Ample liquidity continues to push up asset prices. After strong lending growth through April, the market expects a slowdown in May/June. But May’s volume could be close to April’s (RMB591.8b), and June could see further growth, thanks to the non-seasonal pick-up in economic activities for the summer months
• DBS: State-owned enterprises' profits track exports more closely than GDP growth, suggesting that profits will remain under stress even as domestic conditions improve. Sticky wages and increasing commodity input prices increase the pressure from the cost side. Further, because inflation is likely to pick up before corporate profits, SOE's will likely face tighter credit conditions before their balance sheets improve
• Policy responses have boosted confidence and prevented further contractions of consumption and investment. Property, retail, and auto sales are healthy in volume terms, even if prices remain deflationary. The real impact of the stimulus will take time to filter through the economy and will show up in H2 2009
• The Chinese equity market continues to be speculative because hedging tools are limited (deterring institutional investors) information on the companies is sparse. Level of government meddling in the market makes true transparency difficult Many retail investors (who led the boom in 2007) retreated to demand deposits
• After a surge of IPOs in 07-08, there have been no new issues since Sept 08, when regulators feared new supply could further damage existing shares. The China Securities Regulatory Commission issued new regulations for listings on June 11 and has taken legal actions intended to ensure that Chinese markets are less prone to manipulation; IPOs are expected to resume soon
  
• New listings and release of block shares could drain funds from existing shares, threatening this year’s gains. The rule changes are intended to increase access for retail investors to IPOs, and limit the valuation surges that followed flotations in 07-08
• In an apparent attempt to reduce market volatility as new IPOs come online, the government is requiring that SOEs that have listed since 2005 transfer 10% of their shares to the social security fund, which will be subject to a 3-year lock-up period
• In 2007, regulations intended to deflate Chinese equity markets were implemented (stamp tax raised from 0.1% to 0.3% in May 07), these were mostly reversed in 2008 when markets fell sharply (stamp tax repealed completely in Sept 08). In an attempt to boost existing shares, IPOs were suspended in Sept 08
  
• The average daily volume on the Shanghai exchange has more than doubled to 13.6bn yuan in May 2009 from a low of 4.4bn yuan in Aug 2008
  

Sectoral Outlook
• Citi: Consumer-facing sectors could benefit from policy shifts that would help boost domestic consumption. Auto sector profits trail sales growth, banking sector profits down y/y but show q/q momentum, cement and food/beverage sectors should outperform, and insurance sector looks positive
• UOB: A pick-up in demand in H2 2009 should benefit energy producers. Dropping property inventories and the massive reduction in equity ratio requirement (20% from 35%) for new ordinary residential projects will boost the property sector, in turn boosting demand for steel and aluminum, as well as energy
• Planned massive infrastructure spending on the mobile network over the next 3 years should boost the telecommunications sector. Export-oriented industries (steel, shipbuilding, coal), despite stimulus spending, are reliant on a pickup in global demand
• Fidelity: railways, materials and the property companies may benefit from stimulus efforts. Industry leaders may benefit from consolidation. The large scale railway expansion should also boost demand for steel and cement. Conversely financial services and energy companies place more challenges ahead
  
• Domestic retail sales continue to grow on the back of government subsidy programs and the wealth-effect of rising asset prices, however exports remain in contraction.
• Chinese oil demand returned to positive growth in April, and Chinese oil firms were able to use favorable credit conditions to purchase assets abroad when oil prices were depressed

p/s photos: Suzanne Sae

Can China's Demand Strength Stir Global Demand?

# Signs that extensive government investment and credit extension are contributing to a soft landing for China are giving rise to hopes that Chinese demand might support other emerging economies. Chinese commodity imports, which have surged in volume terms, may be supporting commodity exporters in Latin America and Asia in particular, yet other imports continue to be weak.

What Countries Might Benefit From Chinese Demand?

# Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea have been more dependent on exports to China, while several South East Asian economies like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have lower dependency.
# The composition of Chinese imports has also shifted. Fewer intermediate goods are being sourced for the processing trade given weak demand in the G3, the ultimate recipient of such goods. This shift, if persistent, could hurt traditional exporters in East Asia like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan which have tended to be reliant on Chinese demand.
# China’s imports of commodities such as iron ore, coal and crude oil have been extraordinarily strong, increasing speculation that China is building strategic inventories of the most important commodities - boosting Latin America (especially Brazil and Chile) the ASEAN countries and Australia.
# With Latin American trade with China having increased, a Chinese slowdown would have a more significant role than one in the U.S. or the EU.
# While strong US retail sales previously pushed up exports from China, in turn boosting China’s imports, the engine for China’s economic recovery is now likely to be public works spending. Thus, China's imports from Japan may be lower than expected.

Will Chinese Recovery Lead to Import Growth?

# China seems to be sourcing an increased share of parts and intermediate goods domestically. Despite an increase in car sales, auto parts imports and autos have not increased. China has been implementing a Buy China policy for its stimulus projects which might continue to hold down China's goods and services imports.
# Over time, as China's growth shifts to more domestic sources, its demand will boost the rest of Asia. In the short-term, however, a sustainable recovery in developing Asia depends on positive developments in advanced economies. While Chinese government investment has boosted its outlook in the short-term, such efforts may provide little support in 2010 if global demand continues to be weak. A reduction in Chinese exports and export related capex could lead to weaker potential GDP over the next three to five years.
# Overall, Chinese imports continue to seem weaker than would be anticipated during an investment boom. Land purchases may account for a significant share of the reported Fixed asset increase.
# There is a risk that Chinese investment might be contributing to further overcapacities and domestic imbalances. If China (and other export economies) continue to export capacity rather than boost consumption in the face of global demand, it could weaken the prospects of global economic recovery.
# The rebound in China’s exports since early in 2009 has been weaker than in most other Asian countries, suggesting that China has been a major driver in Asian countries’ export recovery.
# China can lead but that will not be enough to save the world or the other Asian economies.
# China generates only 7% of global output, at market prices; moreover, real imports are likely to fall 5% in 2009 . China's net stimulus to the rest of the world will only be around 0.1% of global output.
# A slowdown to 6% or less in China’s growth rate would have significant impact on the already weak global economy.
# Even if it escapes a hard landing and achieves 7-8% growth, subpar GDP growth in China over the next two years at least will weigh on global growth.
# Income increases in East Asian countries and currency appreciation would cause large increases in consumption imports (those that are consumed at home). In 2006, in addition, U.S. consumption goods imports in 2006 equaled $430 billion while East Asian consumption goods imports equaled $220 billion.


p/s photos: Zhang Xin Yu

China's Lending Explosion

Is there anything wrong with China's lending spree. The central bank basically "advised" banks to ratchet up their lending, and the banks followed dutifully for the past couple of quarters with amazing results.

First of all, you cannot suddenly find so many attractive "borrowers" to lend aggressively to. Secondly, not many will say no when you offer to lend them money.

To be fair, this strategy pulled the domestic economy from falling further along with the ill effects of a global economy in crisis, but at what price. As I have mentioned before, this has to play itself out, and will not result in a sudden correction in property or stock prices in China. The liquidity rush will soon find its way into higher equity prices in China (hence bullish for the rest of the year for Chinese equity), and some may trickle back into Chinese property mart as well. Brace for high default rates when the music stops, probably after Chinese New Year in 2010.

China’s new lending more than doubled in June from a month earlier, increasing concerns bad loans and asset bubbles will emerge amid a credit boom.

New lending was 1.53 trillion yuan ($224 billion), the central bank said on its Web site today, bringing total lending this year to 7.4 trillion yuan. The calculation for new loans is preliminary, the central bank added.

The government is countering an export collapse by flooding the economy with money to fuel domestic demand. Rapid credit growth poses a risk to the nation’s lenders and a concentration of credit in some industries and businesses may damage the stability of the financial system, the banking regulator said yesterday.

Excess liquidity is fueling speculation and that means asset bubbles and wasteful investment. Already China recently failed to complete a $4.1bn auction of one-year government bonds, which suggested that investors are positioning for higher inflation caused by the credit surge.

Just something more to chew on, in 2005 Ernst & Young published a survey estimating that the bad loans in the Chinese banking system equaled close to $900 billion. Since then there has been enormous speculation in both the stock and real estate market. The average urban residential property prices fell by 15 to 30 per cent over the next two years from their levels at the end of 2008. Of course, by the end of 2008 they had already fallen from there 2007 highs. You cannot have real estate fall that much without having bad loans. Here is the juicy part, according to the prospectus for the Commercial Bank of China, it is illegal in China to foreclose on residential property.So what are bad loans? Bad loans = immediate write downs? No, they are then carried as what??? ... long term assets??? The reality is that no one knows exactly how bad the situation is in any bank. Information has value and is not disclosed unless required by law or for consideration. Since the banks in China are owned by the state, there is no legal requirement.


Something's gotta give ... but let's have a bull run first...

p/s photos: Elanne Kong Yuk Lam